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## Memorandum of Conversation

(b)(1)(4)(5) 30 is authority to:

( ) CLASSIFY as OADR

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DATE: February 2, 1970

February 12, 1970

SUBJECT:

US-Chinese Talks in Warsaw

PARTICIPANTS:

Meeting 1 -  
2/2/70

Mr. Kreisberg, Director, EA/ACA

Meeting 2 -  
2/12/70

Mr. Paul H. Kreisberg, Director, EA/ACA

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1. called on me in my office and probed for nearly an hour on U.S. motives in talking with the Chinese, the relation of our talks to Sino-Soviet negotiations, why we shifted from the Polish Palace to our respective Embassies, etc. He constructed a series of hypothetical interpretation of why the United States and Peking should now have renewed their meetings and what we might be talking about, including trade, travel, newspapermen, the Taiwan Strait Patrol, etc. I listened politely and declined to comment on any of his hypothesis. I suggested that it would be foolish to anticipate that the many very substantive problems between the U.S. and Peking were going to disappear overnight, or even over a considerable period of time. Our objective was to set in motion a dialogue which would have the effect of reducing tensions and gradually of enabling us to work toward some specific, even if modest, understandings on some of the issues we had in the past talked about in public. listened politely but was obviously not persuaded.

EA/ACA:PHK:ced  
(Drawing Office and Officer)

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2.

2.        had originally invited me out for a long lunch, but at the last minute I had to suggest we have a quick cafeteria lunch in the Department. Following the same general line of questioning as        but much less intensively and doggedly (he apologized at one point for asking a question about the Warsaw talks; I told him I could not answer). He focussed more on the benefits to the Chinese and possibly the U.S. of "worrying" the Soviets through Sino-U.S. conversations in secret. Acknowledging some evidence of Soviet concern on this point, I professed not to understand the reason for it. I expressed incredulity that the Soviets could anticipate that the U.S. and Communist China were likely to move to reconcile their difficulties to such a degree that this in any respect could be threatening or dangerous to the USSR.

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